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Abstract In this paper, we report on a series of free-form bargaining experiments in 
which two players have to distribute four indivisible goods among themselves. In one 
treatment, players are informed about the monetary payoffs associated with each bundle 
of goods; in a second treatment only the ordinal ranking of the bundles is given. We find 
that in both cases, inequality aversion plays a prominent role. In the ordinal treatment, 
individuals apparently use the ranks in the respective preference orderings over bundles 
of goods as a substitute for the unknown monetary value. Allocations that distribute the 
value (money or ranks, respectively) most equally serve as natural “reference points” for 
the bargaining processes. Frequently, such “equal split” allocations are chosen by our 
subjects even though they are Pareto dominated; but also if they are rejected for that 
reason they matter in a specific way: whether a Pareto optimal allocation is chosen or not 
depends on whether or not it is a Pareto improvement relative to the equal split. 
Interestingly, we find much less Pareto-damaging behavior due to inequality aversion in 
the ordinal treatment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent research in explaining observed behavior of individuals in laboratory experiments 
has focused on the question of how to model the agents’ distributional preferences, 
see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and 
Rabin (2002) (henceforth F&S, B&O and C&R, respectively). The common assumption 
in these models is that agents are not only motivated by their own material payoff but by 
the entire ditribution of monetary rewards. Specifically, F&S and B&O suggest 
parametric forms of the utility function incorporating different notions of inequality 
aversion according to which utility decreases with the differences in individual payoffs. 
By contrast, C&R propose a model of social-welfare preferences according to which 
agents are concerned with maximizing a combination of the aggregate payoff for the 
group and the payoff of the worst-off individual. The two approaches have been 
compared and tested against each other by Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
1
 
By assigning significance to differences and sums of monetary rewards, the 
proposed models of social preferences use individual utility information in a cardinal and 
interpersonally comparable way. While this can be justified, e.g. by assuming quasi-
linearity of the underlying preferences, it also shows that the applicability of the existing 
models is restricted to situations in which individual monetary rewards are known to all 
agents and in which preferences over allocations can be adequately described in terms of 
the distribution of monetary rewards. 
The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that the basic intuitions behind 
the distributional preference approach can be fruitfully applied in more general situations. 
To this end, we conducted a series of free-form bargaining experiments in which two 
players had to jointly determine an allocation of four indivisible goods. In one treatment 
both agents were informed about the specific monetary value associated with the bundles 
of goods for each player (the same bundle usually had different monetary value for the 
two players). In the other treatment, each player was only informed about her own and 
the opponent’s ordinal ranking of the bundles, i.e. only the ordinal ranking of the 
monetary payments associated with each bundle was given. Despite the lack of numerical 
                                               
1 See, among others, also the comments by Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) and Fehr, Naef and Schmidt 
(2006), as well as the reply by Engelmann and Strobel (2006). 
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payoff information in the latter treatment, we find that individuals rely on interpersonal 
comparisons also in this case. Indeed, we find strong evidence that agents use the rank of 
a bundle in the respective preference ordering as a substitute for its unknown monetary 
value. Taking these ranks as the basis for interpersonal comparisons, the motives behind 
the formation of distributional preferences, such as inequality aversion or social concerns 
in general, are relevant also in the treatment with ordinal information. In fact, the 
comparison between the two treatments reveals that individual behavior can be accounted 
for by a simple unifying qualitative theory of distributional preferences. Specifically, the 
outcomes that we observed in our bargaining experiments suggest that a significant 
proportion of agents’ behavior is guided by the following rule:  
 
Conditional Pareto Improvement from Equal Split (CPIES):  
First, determine the most equal distribution of rewards. If this allocation is 
Pareto optimal, then choose it. Otherwise, if there is the possibility to 
make everyone better off, implement such a Pareto improvement provided 
that this does not create “too much” inequality. 
 
If the monetary rewards are known, the “most equal” distributions are of course 
the ones with minimal difference of the numerical payoffs for the two agents.
2
 If, on the 
other hand, only the ordinal rankings of the bundles of goods are given, then the “most 
equal” distributions are those with minimal difference of the ranks in the respective 
preference orderings. Similarly, “too much inequality” is to be understood in terms of 
differences in monetary payoffs and ranks, respectively. Of course, how much precisely 
“too much” is, depends on individual preferences and varies from subject to subject. 
The above rule combines elements of the inequality aversion approach of F&S 
and B&O on the one hand, and the social-welfare preference approach of C&R on the 
other. With the former it shares the important role played by interpersonal equality, with 
                                               
2 In our setting with two players, there are at most two such distributions in the feasible set. With more than 
two players, the meaning of “most equal” distribution can be made precise using the theory of inequality 
measurement; for instance, by applying the (partial) criterion of Lorenz dominance.   
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the latter the demand for Pareto optimality (in the payoff space).
3
 Interpersonal inequality 
plays a twofold role here. First, the absence of inequality determines an initial reference 
point for the bargaining problem. Secondly, it serves as a constraint in the process of 
achieving a Pareto optimal outcome. In contrast to C&R’s results, we systematically find 
Pareto-damaging behavior in the treatment with known monetary rewards.
4
 Interestingly, 
however, such behavior is only very rarely observed in the ordinal treatment. Our 
conjecture is that this is due to the uncertainty about the differences in final payments 
associated with differences in ordinal ranks. Indeed, it seems that rank inequality 
becomes acceptable because it does not necessarily correspond to unequal monetary 
payoffs. One conclusion from our study is thus that, by making inequality precisely 
quantifiable, monetary payoff information hinders the realization of Pareto 
improvements. 
The CPIES rule admits two different interpretations. The first is purely outcome-
oriented: whether or not an allocation is compatible with the CPIES rule can be decided 
simply by looking at the resulting inequality and by determining whether or not it is a 
Pareto improvement relative to the most equal allocation. The second interpretation of the 
CPIES rule is as a proper procedure according to which bargaining partners first 
determine a “disagreement point” which then serves as the reference distribution for the 
later bargaining process. In Section 4 below, we look at both interpretations. In terms of 
statistical analysis, the relevance of the CPIES rule is more easily tested in its outcome-
oriented version. On the other hand, an analysis of the communication protocols of the 
experiments shows that the CPIES rule indeed frequently materializes in the procedural 
sense: the equal reference distribution is proposed, or mentioned in the discussion 
although not necessarily proposed, and then the bargaining partners either settle on a 
Pareto improvement from there, or choose the equal distribution. 
Our experimental design differs from the literature in several respects. First, while 
most of the existing studies on distributional preferences have focused on variants of 
                                               
3 Pareto optimality is defined in payoff space as opposed to utility space, since the relevant notion of 
optimality here is based on the distribution of material payoffs (respectively, ranks), not on the subjective 
distributional preferences. 
4 C&R’s model does allow for inequality aversion and is capable to incorporate Pareto-damaging behavior 
for suitable values of the parameters. However, C&R’s experimental results suggest parameter values that 
exclude Pareto-damaging behavior. 
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either dictator or ultimatum games, we consider free-form bargaining here. In terms of  
experimental set-up, we thus follow the literature initiated by Roth and Malouf (1979) 
who tested the predictive power of the Nash bargaining solution using an unstructured 
bargaining process (see also the subsequent literature, in particular Roth and Murnighan 
(1982), and the review in Kagel and Roth (1995)). The main reason for the departure of 
our experimental design from the existing literature on social preferences was the 
conjectured presence of a procedural aspect influencing the outcome. For instance, the 
role of the equal distribution as a reference point is much easier uncovered in an 
unstructured bargaining process than in a rigid strategic game. Qualitatively, our results 
confirm findings of the early study by Kalisch et al. (1953). Using an informal bargaining 
process, these authors tested solution concepts of cooperative game theory, and in 
particular, how members of a coalition would share the joint surplus among each other. 
One of their findings was that in the process of coalition formation, the “core” or 
founding members (mostly two individuals) often split the initial surplus equally. While 
our context is clearly different, the role of the equal distribution as reference point for the 
bargaining process emerges here in a pronounced way as well.
5
 
Data generated by free-form bargaining processes are arguably more difficult to 
interpret than data from more structured bargaining problems such as dictator and 
ultimatum games, or alternate offer games. But our experimental design also has evident 
advantages in terms of exploration of the motives underlying bargaining behavior.
6
 In 
particular, data from free-form bargaining are much better suited to contribute to our 
understanding of the procedural and cognitive aspects involved. The growing but still 
small literature on procedural justice suggests that the way in which final resource 
allocations are brought about has a significant impact on their acceptability. The role that 
procedures play in resource allocation problems has been investigated from different 
perspectives. For instance, Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (2005) find that unequal 
distributions are more easily accepted if they are the outcome of an ex-ante fair 
procedure, say of a fair lottery. Shor (2007), on the other hand, examines the effects of 
the distribution of decision power among individuals. Our study complements this 
                                               
5 The role of reference points in ultimatum bargaining has recently been emphasized by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2005). 
6 Cf. Camerer (2003, Ch.4). 
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literature by examining how the bargaining proposals evolve over time and by directly 
looking at our subjects’ arguments and reasoning during the bargaining process in order 
to identify regularities and recurring patterns.
 7
 We view the present paper as a first 
explorative step and hope that it will stimulate further research in this direction. 
Another distinctive feature of our experimental design is the framing of the 
decision problem as one of distributing indivisible goods. Hence, the feasible payoff 
distributions are explicitly derived from an underlying economic allocation.
8
 In contrast 
to Kalisch et al. (1953), Roth and Malouf (1979), or Shor (2007) the set of feasible utility 
distributions is thus restricted.
9
 More importantly, our design allows us to induce purely 
ordinal preference information and to compare the corresponding results with those 
obtained under full (cardinal) payoff information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
experimental design and Section 3 the division problems that we tested. Section 4 
presents the results, treating the outcome-oriented and process-oriented interpretation of 
the CPIES rule in two separate subsections. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
 
We ran four different bargaining experiments (EXP I – IV) in six sessions each. Eight 
subjects participated in each session, so that the total number of subjects was 192 
(=8*6*4). Each session consisted of five different rounds (R1 – R5). Subjects were re-
matched in pairs after each round; no subjects met twice.
10
 We treated the results in each 
round as independent observations.
11
 The experiments took place in June and July 2001 
                                               
7 There is a large related literature on procedural fairness in psychology, see, e.g., Lind and Tyler (1988) for 
a rich monograph, and Tyler and Lind (2000) for a more recent survey. 
8 We employed a similar design in Herreiner and Puppe (2004). Part of the data reported here were also 
used in that paper in order to test for the relevance of the criterion of envy-freeness.    
9 Another minor difference to Roth and Malouf (1979) is that proposals made by bargaining partners could 
be withdrawn and became binding only after confirmation by both partners.   
10 For the matching of subjects, see Appendix 1. 
11 Although subjects never met twice, it is obviously possible that the behavior and/or experience in earlier 
rounds had an impact on how subjects behaved in later rounds. We tested whether behavior in comparable 
or even identical problems was the same irrespective of what happened before. Specifically, we compared 
EXP I R4, EXP II R1, EXP II R5, and also EXP I R5, EXP II R2, EXP II R4; lastly, we compared the 
identical problems EXP I R3 and EXP II R3. The null hypothesis that the behavior is the same in these 
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(EXP I, II and III) and November 2002 (EXP IV) at the University of Bonn. Almost all 
subjects were students at the University of Bonn, most of them in economics or law. 
In each round of each experiment, the subject pairs had to bargain over the 
distribution of four indivisible goods, denoted by A,B,C and D. Bargaining partners had 
to reach an agreement within
12
 10 minutes, otherwise neither received anything. Partners 
communicated via computer by sending proposals at any time. A proposal consisted of a 
specification of a distribution of the four goods between the two players. Each good 
could be given to only one player, and all four goods had to be distributed (no free 
disposal). In addition to sending proposals, bargaining partners had the possibility to 
support their proposals by verbal messages that they sent via a “chat” device on the 
screen (see the instructions in Appendix 4 for screen examples). When two partners had 
proposed the same allocation of goods, they were asked for confirmation. If both 
confirmed, the goods were allocated accordingly and the round was over for them. If two 
partners could not reach an agreement within 10 minutes neither player received a good 
and the round was over. 
Each bundle of goods corresponded to a value in experimental currency (“Taler”). 
The Taler values of the bundles ranged from 0 (for the empty bundle) to 100 (for all four 
goods combined). The conversion rate was 24 Taler for 1 €.
13
 Importantly, the same 
bundle typically had a different value for different players. Moreover, the value functions 
were not additive, i.e. the value of a combination of goods was in general different from 
the sum of the values of its components. Thus, the valuations allowed for 
complementarities between goods.  For instance, in Table 1 below, good B is worth 7 
Taler and good C is worth 3 Taler for player 2; however, the bundle BC that combines 
them is worth 75 Taler. Also, the bundle BC is more valuable than the bundle AC 
                                                                                                                                            
cases cannot be rejected at any relevant significance level (weaker than 10%) based on two tailed exact 
Fisher tests for any pairwise comparison of the relevant rounds across experiments. The Fisher tests 
considered the two most frequently chosen allocations for each case. χ2 tests based on all chosen allocations 
yielded similar results. It thus seems justified to treat the results in each round as independent observations 
(see also C&R, p.827 for a similar approach). 
The regression results in Appendix 3 support the independence assumption. 
12 Once all pairs had agreed on an allocation, the round was over for everybody and the next round started 
immediately. 
13 In the experiments before January 1, 2002, the conversion rate was 12 Taler for 1 DM. 
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although good A taken in isolation is more valuable (8 Taler) than good B taken in 
isolation.
14
 
 There were two different treatments. In treatment CARD each subject was 
informed about the precise Taler value of each bundle for either player (as in Table 1 
below). In treatment ORD the subjects were only informed about the ordinal ranking of 
the bundles of goods for either player and about the fact that the empty bundle earned 0 
whereas all four goods combined yielded 100 Taler (see Table 2 below).
15
 Note that 
complementarities between goods can also be present in the ordinal treatment. For  
 
          Player 1  Player 2  Player 1  Player 2 
Monetary 
Payoffs 
Bundles  Bundles 
Monetary 
Payoffs 
 Bundles 
 
Bundles 
100 ABCD  ABCD 100  ABCD  ABCD 
98 ABC  ABC 97  BCD  ABC 
95 ABD  ABD 96  ABD  BCD 
93 CBD  ACD 91  ABC  ABD 
83 ACD  CBD 88  ACD  ACD 
66 AB  BC 75  AC  AB 
57 CD  AC 45  AD  AC 
53 BC  BD 42  AB  CD 
46 AD  CD 40  BC  BC 
45 BD  AB 28  CD  BD 
20 AC  AD 19  BD  AD 
9 B  A 8  D  B 
5 A  B 7  C  C 
3 C  C 3  A  A 
1 D  D 2  B  D 
0 -  - 0  -  - 
Table 1: Example of treatment CARD  
(EXP I, R3 = EXP II, R3) 
 Table 2: Ex. of treatment 
ORD (EXP III, R3) 
 
 
                                               
14 The complementarities between goods forced subjects to focus on the entire ranking of bundles of goods, 
which is important for the interpretation of our results. 
15 During the instructions, the subjects were given several (extreme) examples in order to show that the 
unknown cardinal numbers behind the ordinal rankings could be very different, in particular far away from 
an equidistant scale. 
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instance, B and C are the two most valuable single goods for player 2 in Table 2; 
nevertheless, the bundle BC is not the most valuable combination of two goods. 
Experiments EXP I and II involved the CARD and ORD treatments, and EXP III and IV 
only the ORD treatment. 
 
 9 
3. The Bargaining Problems 
 
We now describe the bargaining problems that we tested. Each experiment is 
summarized in a separate table that shows the data of the examples used in each of the  
 
   R1       R2       R3       R4       R5    
n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a.   P1  P2     P1  P2     P1  P2   
100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 
95 ABC  BCD 98 98 ABC  BCD 94 98 ABC  ABC 97 95 ABC  ABD 98 98 ABC  BCD 94 
92 ACD  ABD 95 96 ACD  ABD 90 95 ABD  ABD 96 92 BCD  ACD 95 96 ACD  ABD 90 
89 BCD  ABC 87 92 BCD  ACD 86 93 BCD  ACD 91 89 ABD  ABC 87 92 BCD  ABC 86 
82 ABD  ACD 84 88 ABD  ABC 81 83 ACD  BCD 88 82 ACD  BCD 84 88 ABD  ACD 81 
60 BC  BD 64 60 BD  CD 64 66 AB  BC 75 60 AB  AD 64 60 BC  BD 64 
55 AB  BC 47 45 AC  BC 53 57 CD  AC 45 55 AC  AB 47 45 AB  BC 53 
50 CD  AC 43 40 CD  AD 50 53 BC  BD 42 50 BD  BC 43 40 CD  AC 50 
46 AD  CD 38 36 AB  AC 44 46 AD  CD 40 46 CD  BD 38 36 AD  CD 44 
35 BD  AB 30 30 AD  BD 32 45 BD  AB 28 35 AD  AC 30 30 BD  AB 32 
28 AC  AD 27 28 BC  AB 26 20 AC  AD 19 28 BC  CD 27 28 AC  AD 26 
15 C  B 17 9 C  D 19 9 B  A 8 15 B  A 17 9 C  B 19 
12 A  D 11 8 A  B 15 5 A  B 7 12 C  D 11 8 A  D 15 
7 B  C 5 5 B  C 10 3 C  C 3 7 A  B 5 5 B  C 10 
5 D  A 4 2 D  A 7 1 D  D 2 5 D  C 4 2 D  A 7 
0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 
 P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆  
AB CD 10 PO 2 AB CD 10 PO 3 BD AC 14  0 CD AB 21 PO 1 AB CD 21 PO 1 
AD BC 6 PO 2 BD AC 8 PO 3 AD BC 7 PO 29 AC BD 1 PO 17 CD AB 1  8 
BD AC 2  2 AD BC 2  3 AB CD 2 PO 26        C ABD 1 PO 81 
AC BD 2 PO 5 BC AD 1  3                      
CD AB 1  2 AC BD 1  3                      
ACD B 1 PO 9                             
ABCD - 1 PO 15                             
   23       22       23       22       23    
 
Table 3: EXP I 
The upper part of the table shows the two rankings participants (P1, P2) saw during the 5 rounds of the 
experiment (R1-R5); “n.a.” indicates an ordinal treatment (R1, R2), where players did not see the monetary 
payoffs (in light grey). In the cardinal treatments (R3-R5), players saw the ranking of bundles with 
corresponding monetary payoffs next to them, as shown above. 
The lower part of the table lists the allocations (P1’s and P2’s bundle) that were chosen from most to least 
frequent (#), identifying whether an allocation was Pareto optimal; the last column (∆) shows the rank 
differences in the ordinal treatment, respectively the monetary payoff differences in the cardinal treatment. 
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five rounds in the upper part (rows 2 – 18) and summarizes the results in the lower part 
(rows 20 – 27). 
Table 3 above refers to EXP I. In row 2, “n.a.” stands for “not available” and 
refers to the fact that in the ORD treatment the later Taler payments associated with the 
bundles of goods (printed in light gray in the tables) were not known by the two players 
at the time of bargaining. In the upper part of the table, the columns P1 and P2 indicate 
the ordinal rankings of the bundles for player 1 and 2, respectively. The lower part of the 
table (rows 20 – 27) shows the chosen distributions of goods (column P1 indicates player 
1’s bundle and column P2 player 2’s bundle). The frequency of the respective choices is 
shown in column 3 (#). Thus, for instance, the allocation (AB,CD) (i.e. the bundle AB for 
player 1, and the bundle CD for player 2) was chosen by 10 bargaining partners in R1 of 
EXP I. The fourth column of the bottom part indicates whether the respective distribution 
is Pareto optimal. Finally, the fifth column (∆) gives the difference in the ranks of the 
respective bundles in the preference orderings of the two players, and, if applicable, also 
the difference in Taler payoffs. Thus, for instance in R3 of EXP I, the Pareto optimal 
distribution (AD,BC) was chosen seven times, it involves a difference of 3 ranks, and a 
payoff difference of 29 Taler. 
EXP I involved both the ORD and the CARD treatments, as the first two rounds 
were without numerical payoff information. However, these two rounds were designed 
for a different purpose and are evaluated in Herreiner and Puppe (2004); the same applies 
to the example in R5 in EXP III (see Table 5 below).
16
 The distinctive feature of the 
division problem in R3 of EXP I is the tension between equality and efficiency. The 
distribution (BD,AC) of goods results in the equal distribution (45,45) of monetary 
payoffs; however, this distribution is strictly dominated by the distribution (AD,BC) that 
yields payoffs (46,75). By contrast, the most equal distributions in the last two rounds of 
                                               
16 Specifically, these examples were designed to test the criterion of envy freeness. For instance, in R1 of 
EXP I the distribution (AB,CD) is envy free since each player prefers her own bundle to that of her partner. 
This property does not hold, say, for the distribution (AD,BC), where player 1 would rather have her 
partner’s bundle. In R1 and R2 of EXP I and R5 of EXP III there is no unambiguous distribution which 
may serve as reference point for the CPIES procedure; by consequence, the observed choices (see Tables 3 
and 5) support the CPIES prediction in a trivial way. The results of all three examples do confirm the other 
findings reported here, in particular the result that, in contrast to the cardinal treatment, Pareto optimality is 
often achieved in the ordinal treatment. 
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EXP I, i.e. the distribution (CD,AB) in R4 and the distribution (AB,CD) in R5, are both 
Pareto optimal.  
Table 4 below shows the examples and results of EXP II which involved only the 
CARD treatment. The example tested in R3 with the trade-off between equality and 
efficiency is identical to R3 of EXP I. In all other rounds, the unambiguously most equal 
distribution is Pareto optimal.  
 
 
   R1       R2       R3       R4       R5    
  P1  P2     P1  P2     P1  P2     P1  P2     P1  P2   
100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 
95 ABC  BCD 98 98 ABC  BCD 94 98 ABC  ABC 97 97 ABC  BCD 95 96 ABC  BCD 97 
92 ACD  ABD 95 96 ACD  ABD 90 95 ABD  ABD 96 95 ACD  ABD 91 91 ACD  ABD 93 
89 BCD  ABC 87 92 BCD  ACD 86 93 BCD  ACD 91 93 BCD  ABC 86 90 BCD  ABC 88 
82 ABD  ACD 84 88 ABD  ABC 81 83 ACD  BCD 88 87 ABD  ACD 82 83 ABD  ACD 86 
60 BC  BD 64 60 BC  BD 64 66 AB  BC 75 60 BC  BD 64 60 BC  BD 64 
55 AB  BC 47 45 AB  BC 53 57 CD  AC 45 47 AB  BC 52 56 AB  BC 46 
50 CD  AC 43 40 CD  AC 50 53 BC  BD 42 42 CD  AC 51 52 CD  AC 41 
46 AD  CD 38 36 AD  CD 44 46 AD  CD 40 35 AD  CD 46 45 AD  CD 39 
35 BD  AB 30 30 BD  AB 32 45 BD  AB 28 33 BD  AB 32 39 BD  AB 35 
28 AC  AD 27 28 AC  AD 26 20 AC  AD 19 29 AC  AD 28 31 AC  AD 30 
15 C  B 17 9 C  D 19 9 B  A 8 9 C  B 18 14 C  B 16 
12 A  D 11 8 A  B 15 5 A  B 7 7 A  D 17 13 A  D 14 
7 B  C 5 5 B  C 10 3 C  C 3 6 B  C 11 8 B  C 7 
5 D  A 4 2 D  A 7 1 D  D 2 3 D  A 6 2 D  A 4 
0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 
 P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆  
AD BC 19 PO 1 AB CD 22 PO 1 AD BC 12 PO 29 AB CD 23 PO 1 AD BC 22 PO 1 
AB CD 2 PO 17 BC AD 1 PO 34 BD AC 8  0 CD AB 1  10 BC AD 1 PO 30 
ACD B 1 PO 75                    AB CD 1 PO 17 
BD AC 1  8                             
CD AB 1  20                             
   24       23       20       24       24    
 
Table 4: EXP II 
The upper part of the table shows the two rankings participants (P1, P2) saw during the 5 rounds of the 
experiment (R1-R5). Players saw the ranking of bundles with corresponding monetary payoffs next to 
them, as shown above. 
The lower part of the table lists the allocations (P1’s and P2’s bundle) that were chosen from most to least 
frequent (#), identifying whether an allocation was Pareto optimal, and indicating the corresponding 
monetary payoff differences (∆). 
 
 
 12
EXP III and IV only involved the ORD treatment. Table 5 summarizes EXP III. 
R1 in EXP III was designed to test the impact of the number of goods on the choice of 
allocations. Note that the distributions (AB,CD) and (ABC,D) are both Pareto 
improvements from the reference distribution (AD,BC), and both involve a rank 
difference of 3. Nevertheless, (AB,CD) is chosen much more frequently (14 times versus  
 
 
   R1       R2       R3       R4       R5    
n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. 
100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 
95 ACD  BCD 90 98 ABC  ACD 94 98 BCD  ABC 97 85 BCD  ACD 85 98 ABC  BCD 94 
80 BCD  ACD 80 96 ABD  ABD 90 95 ABD  BCD 96 80 ACD  BCD 80 96 ACD  ABD 90 
70 CD  ABD 70 92 BCD  BCD 86 93 ABC  ABD 91 60 CD  ABD 73 92 BCD  ACD 86 
65 ABC  CD 48 88 ACD  ABC 81 83 ACD  ACD 88 40 ABC  CD 67 88 ABD  ABC 81 
63 ABD  BD 45 60 AC  BC 58 66 AC  AB 75 38 ABD  AD 62 60 BD  CD 64 
50 BD  AD 40 45 BC  AC 53 57 AD  AC 45 32 AD  BD 57 45 AC  BC 53 
32 AB  D 35 38 AD  AB 50 53 AB  CD 42 24 BC  D 50 40 CD  AD 50 
30 AC  ABC 32 36 AB  CD 44 46 BC  BC 40 23 AB  ABC 49 36 AB  AC 44 
25 AD  BC 30 30 BD  AD 32 45 CD  BD 28 20 BD  AC 44 30 AD  BD 32 
20 BC  AB 28 28 CD  BD 26 20 BD  AD 19 19 AC  AB 37 28 BC  AB 26 
15 B  AC 20 9 B  D 19 9 D  B 8 9 A  BC 30 9 C  D 19 
10 D  C 15 8 A  A 15 5 C  C 7 7 D  C 9 8 A  B 15 
5 C  A 10 5 C  C 10 3 A  A 3 5 C  B 8 5 B  C 10 
2 A  B 5 2 D  B 7 1 B  D 2 2 B  A 1 2 D  A 7 
0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 
 P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆  
AB CD 14 PO 3 AD BC 17 PO 2 AB CD 19 PO 0 BC AD 13 PO 2 BD AC 11 PO 3 
ABC D 3 PO 3 AC BD 4 PO 5 AD BC 1 PO 2 ABC D 7 PO 3 AB CD 7 PO 3 
AC BD 3  3 B ACD 1 PO 10 CD AB 3 PO 4 AB CD 1 PO 4 BC AD 1  3 
CD AB 2 PO 7 AB CD 2  0        AC BD 1  4 ABC D 1 PO 10 
                     ABD C 1  7        
   22       24       23       23       20    
 
Table 5: EXP III 
The upper part of the table shows the two rankings participants (P1, P2) saw during the 5 rounds of the 
experiment (R1-R5), where “n.a.” indicates an ordinal treatment in which players did not see the monetary 
payoffs (in light grey).  
The lower part of the table lists the allocations (P1’s and P2’s bundle) that were chosen from most to least 
frequent (#), identifying whether an allocation was Pareto optimal, and indicating the corresponding rank 
differences (∆). 
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3 times).
17
 We conjecture that this is due to the more equal number of goods distributed.  
R2 and R3 illustrate the CPIES procedure: in R2 the most frequently chosen distribution 
(AD,BC) is the unique Pareto improvement relative to the reference distribution 
(AB,CD). In R3, the reference distribution (AB,CD) itself is Pareto optimal. In R4, there  
are several Pareto improvements relative to the reference distribution (BD,AC) that was 
never chosen. Among these, the most frequently chosen allocation (BC,AD) is the unique  
distribution that minimizes the rank difference, whereas the second-most chosen 
allocation (ABC,D) is a lexicographic refinement of the “Rawlsian” solution (first 
minimize the rank of the worst off player; if this is not unique, minimize among all such 
distributions the rank of the better off player).
18
 In R5 there is no unambiguous reference 
distribution since the minimal rank difference of 3 is achieved by all distributions 
involving two goods for each player. The CPIES procedure is thus not applicable here. 
Nevertheless, also this example confirms the prediction of a rank-difference-minimizing 
distribution among all Pareto optimal distributions (chosen in 90% = 18/20 of all cases). 
Table 6 summarizes EXP IV. The distinctive feature of the example in R1 is that 
there are several Pareto improvements from the reference distribution (AD,BC), not all of 
which are Pareto optimal. Indeed, the rank-difference-minimizing Pareto improvement 
(AC,BD) is itself not Pareto optimal. As the examples R3 of EXP I and EXP II, also this 
example illustrates a tension between inequality and efficiency since 26% (= 6/23) of the 
observed agreements are not Pareto optimal. Interestingly, the effect is less pronounced 
here than in the cardinal treatment with full payoff information (see Section 4 for further 
discussion). The results in R2 very clearly illustrate the role of the rank difference, since 
the feasible Pareto improvements (AC,BD) and (CD,AB) from the reference bundle 
(AB,CD) are never chosen, whereas the Pareto improvement (BC,AD) with rank 
difference 1 is chosen – a rank difference of 3 is apparently considered too large. In 
addition to R4 of EXP III, R3 in EXP IV is the only example where a rank difference 
minimizing Pareto optimal distribution does not automatically coincide with the 
 
                                               
17 The null hypothesis that both Pareto improvements are chosen equally likely can be rejected at p=0.006 
based on a binomial test. 
18 Note also that, in contrast to the distribution (BC,AD), the distribution (ABC,D) is envy free. In this 
example, there are thus several conflicting criteria of quite heterogeneous nature. 
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   R1       R2       R3       R4       R5    
n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. n.a. P1  P2 n.a. 
100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 100 ABCD  ABCD 100 
98 BCD  ACD 87 92 BCD  ABD 97 95 ABC  ABC 85 98 BCD  ABD 87 92 BCD  ABD 97 
92 ABC  ABD 77 87 ACD  ABC 87 90 ACD  BCD 75 92 ABC  ACD 77 87 ABC  ABC 87 
86 ABD  BCD 62 81 ABC  BCD 72 83 ABD  ABD 66 86 ACD  BCD 62 81 ACD  ACD 72 
77 ACD  ABC 60 70 ABD  ACD 70 77 BCD  ACD 62 77 ABD  ABC 60 70 ABD  BCD 70 
60 BC  CD 45 63 CD  BD 49 56 AB  AD 51 60 BC  AB 45 63 CD  BD 49 
55 BD  AB 43 53 BD  AD 43 50 AC  BC 46 55 BD  BD 43 53 BD  AD 43 
42 AB  BD 40 49 BC  BC 40 46 BC  AC 42 42 CD  BC 40 49 BC  AC 40 
39 AC  AD 39 42 AC  AB 36 39 AD  BD 35 39 AB  AD 39 42 AC  CD 36 
35 AD  BC 36 35 AB  CD 32 32 CD  CD 31 35 AC  CD 36 35 AB  AB 32 
31 CD  AC 33 30 AD  AC 29 24 BD  AB 28 31 AD  AC 33 30 AD  BC 29 
12 B  D 24 16 C  B 24 19 A  B 27 12 C  D 24 16 C  A 24 
9 C  A 15 12 D  D 19 13 C  C 17 9 B  A 15 12 B  B 19 
3 A  C 7 9 B  A 15 9 B  A 10 3 D  B 7 9 D  D 15 
2 D  B 2 8 A  C 8 5 D  D 7 2 A  C 2 8 A  C 8 
0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 0 -  - 0 
 P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆   P1 P2 #  ∆  
AB CD 14 PO  2 BC AD 21 PO  1 BC AD 18 PO 2  CD AB 22 PO 2  BD AC 14 PO 1  
AC BD 4   1 BD AC 2   4 AC BD 4 PO 2 BC AD 1 PO 3  BC AD 8 PO 1  
BC AD 4 PO  3 AB CD 1   0        AB CD 1  1  AC BD 2 PO 3  
AD BC 1   0                             
   23       24       22       24       24    
 
Table 6: EXP IV 
The upper part of the table shows the two rankings participants (P1, P2) saw during the 5 rounds of the 
experiment (R1-R5), where “n.a.” indicates an ordinal treatment in which players did not see the monetary 
payoffs (in light grey).  
The lower part of the table lists the allocations (P1’s and P2’s bundle) that were chosen from most to least 
frequent (#), identifying whether an allocation was Pareto optimal, and indicating the corresponding rank 
differences  (∆). 
 
 “Rawlsian” solution, i.e. the maximin solution that minimizes the rank of the 
worst off player. The allocations (AC,BD) and (BC,AD) have the same rank difference of 
2 and are both Pareto optimal, but only (BC,AD) minimizes the rank of the worst off 
player, and consequently also minimizes the rank sum. Remarkably, it is chosen much 
more frequently, namely in 82% (= 18/22) of all cases.
19
 The two final rounds R4 and R5 
once again confirm the role of the three aspects of rank difference, Pareto optimality and 
                                               
19 Note that, compared to (AC,BD), the Rawlsian distribution (BC,AD) not only has a smaller sum of ranks 
for the two players but is also envy free. Therefore, it is not evident which criterion is responsible for the 
result. 
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Pareto superiority relative to the reference distribution. Note that in R5, just as in R1 of 
EXP IV, there is a Pareto improvement from the equal split distribution (AD,BC) that is 
itself not Pareto optimal, namely the distribution (AB,CD) which is dominated by all of 
the chosen distributions; in contrast to the allocation (AC,BD) in R1 – the only Pareto 
improvement with a rank difference of 1 – the distribution (AB,CD) is never chosen in 
R5, where there exist other Pareto improvements with the same rank difference of 1. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
The average earning over all experiments and all subjects was about € 9 (in 
approximately one hour).
20
 In fewer than 5% of our observations (23 of 480), bargaining 
partners did not reach an agreement and thus earned zero in the respective round. The 
majority of rounds lasted 9 minutes or longer since some subject pairs bargained until 
shortly before the deadline. However, many agreements were reached much quicker. For 
instance, in EXP II the median bargaining time ranged from 130 seconds in R5 to 340 
seconds in R3. 
The following analysis is divided in two subsections. First, we present the results 
in terms of the final allocations on which bargaining partners settled. In the second part, 
we then study selected bargaining problems also from a procedural perspective and look 
at the way in which proposals evolved over time. 
 
4.1 Results in Terms of Final Allocations 
The following table summarizes the results in treatment CARD. Each entry in the table 
gives the percentage of the chosen final allocations in the corresponding round (column) 
that satisfy the criterion corresponding to the row. The first row quantifies how many 
distributions were Pareto optimal. The second row gives the share of chosen distributions 
with minimal difference in numerical payoffs (unique in each case), while the third row 
quantifies how many distributions were consistent with the CPIES procedure. Finally, the 
                                               
20 Average earnings were thus comparable to the usual wage for student jobs at the University of Bonn.    
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last row indicates the total number of agreements reached in the respective round 
(maximally 24). 
 
 EXP I EXP II 
Total 
  R3 R4 R5 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
Pareto Optimal 39% 100% 96% 92% 100% 60% 96% 100% 86% 
Min Diff 
(“Reference Point”) 
61% 95% 91% 79% 96% 40% 96% 92% 82% 
CPIES 91% 95% 91% 79% 96% 100% 96% 92% 92% 
Number of Agreements 23 22 23 24 23 20 24 24 183 
Table 7: Results in treatment CARD (EXP I & EXP II) 
The table quantifies the frequency of final allocations in the different bargaining problems compatible with 
the criteria given in the rows.    
 
Of particular interest are R3 in EXP I and R3 in EXP II in which the same division 
problem was given. Here “equal split” involves the allocation (BD,AC) with a resulting 
payoff distribution of (45,45), cf. Tables 3 and 4. In R3 of EXP I, 61% of subject pairs 
choose this allocation, and 40% in R3 of EXP II. The interesting fact is that this 
allocation is not Pareto optimal; the allocation (AD,BC) Pareto dominates the equal split 
with a resulting payoff distribution of (46,75). Note that therefore also both the 
“Rawlsian” maximin criterion and the utilitarian criterion (“maximize the sum of the 
individual payoffs”) favor (AD,BC) over the equal split. Thus, since a significant 
minority of subjects settled on the Pareto inferior distribution (BD,AC), our observations 
do not confirm C&R’s parameter specifications in their model of social preferences.
21
 
The reason for so many subjects to reject the Pareto improvement (AD,BC) seems to be 
the considerable payoff difference of 29 Talers, confirming the presence of inequality 
aversion as modeled by F&S and B&O.  
                                               
21 C&R’s regression estimates strongly support social welfare preferences (ρ>σ≈0) and provide little 
evidence for difference aversion preferences (σ<0), cf. pages 838-841, i.e. according to C&R the payoff-
unequal Pareto improvement should be chosen over the Pareto inferior more equal allocation. Instead, a 
significant share of subjects prefers (45,45) over (46,75) which can be accommodated in the C&R 
framework only by difference aversion preferences (σ<0<ρ<1). 
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 Observe that either the choice of (BD,AC) and the choice of (AD,BC) is 
consistent with the CPIES procedure. In R3 of EXP II these two distributions were the 
only observed outcomes, whereas in R3 in EXP I two subject pairs agreed on the Pareto 
optimal  allocation (AB,CD), a choice which is not consistent with the CPIES prediction 
since (AB,CD) is not a Pareto improvement relative to the equal split distribution 
(BD,AC), see Table 3. The fact that the CPIES-compatible distribution (AD,BC) was 
chosen by 19 out of 43 matched pairs whereas the Pareto optimal allocation (AB,CD) 
was chosen by only 2 of 43 pairs in R3 of EXP I and EXP II combined provides strong 
evidence for our conclusion that the equal distribution (BD,AC) indeed serves as a focal 
reference point (a one-tailed binomial test yields a significance level of 0.0001).
22
 
 Table 8 summarizes the results of treatment ORD. As before, the first row 
gives the percentage of Pareto optimal agreements. The second row quantifies the 
percentage of agreements on the distribution displaying the minimal difference in the 
respective ranks in the two players’ rankings of bundles. Just as the distribution with 
minimal payoff difference in the cardinal treatment, this is the distribution that serves as  
 
 
 
 
 
EXP III EXP IV 
Total 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
Pareto optimal 86% 92% 100% 91% 78% 88% 100% 96% 100% 92% 
Rank Diff Min 
(“Reference Point”) 
0% 8% 83% 0% 4% 4% 0% 4% 0% 11% 
Rank Diff Min 
among Pareto Opt. 
77% 71% 83% 57% 61% 88% 100% 92% 92% 80% 
CPIES 91% 79% 83% 91% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 93% 
Number of 
Agreements 
22 24 23 23 23 24 22 24 24 209 
Table 8: Results in treatment ORD (EXP III & IV) 
The table quantifies the frequency of final allocations in the different bargaining problems compatible with 
the criteria given in the rows.    
 
                                               
22 Part of this strong effect might be due to the fact that the sum of payoffs is somewhat larger in (AD,BC) 
than in (AB,CD). 
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the reference point for the CPIES procedure in the ordinal treatment. For instance, in R1 
of EXP III it is the distribution (AD,BC) since the bundle AD has the same rank in player 
1’s ranking as the bundle BC in player 2’s ranking. The data from R5 of EXP III have 
been left out in Table 8, since there was no unambiguous reference point, as already 
noted above. In all other rounds there was a unique reference distribution.
23
 The third row 
gives the percentage of chosen allocations that are Pareto optimal and achieve the 
minimal rank difference among all Pareto optimal distributions.
24
 This criterion almost 
always coincides with the “Rawlsian” criterion of maximizing the welfare of the worst 
off individual, i.e. in our case of minimizing the maximal rank of a bundle in the player’s 
preference ordering.
25
 Observe also that any distribution that minimizes the rank 
difference among all Pareto optimal distributions either coincides with the reference 
distribution (in R3 of EXP III) or is a Pareto improvement relative to the reference 
distribution (in all other examples of EXP III and IV). The fourth row gives the 
percentage of agreements that are consistent with the CPIES prediction. In EXP III, fewer 
distributions in which each player received two goods were consistent with the CPIES 
prediction as compared to EXP IV. As is apparent from the numbers in Tables 7 and 8, 
the allocations according to the CPIES rule were not chosen randomly. We tested this 
using a binomial test and found the results to be highly significant; the p-values are given 
in Appendix 2. The CPIES rule can also not be replaced by any of the other criteria – no 
combination of other criteria explains more than 40% of the variation in the allocation 
choices based on CPIES in either the ORD or CARD treatment – see Appendix 2 for 
details. 
                                               
23 In R3 of EXP III, the reference distribution was Pareto optimal and chosen in 83% of all cases (cf. Table 
8). In all other examples of the ordinal treatment, the reference distribution was not Pareto optimal and 
chosen only in 3% (=6/186) of all cases.  
24 In R2, R3, R4 of EXP III and in R1, R2, R4 of EXP IV this criterion yields a unique prediction. In the 
other rounds, there were two rank difference minimizing distributions. 
25 The only exceptions are R4 in EXP III and R3 in EXP IV. In R4 in EXP III there are two “Rawlsian” 
solutions, namely (BC,AD) and (ABC,D). While both are Pareto optimal, the first of these distributions 
involves a rank difference of 2, whereas the second distribution represents the lexicographic refinement of 
the Rawlsian solution with a rank difference of 3. In accordance with the CPIES rule, the first distribution 
was chosen much more often. In R3 of EXP IV on the other hand, there are two rank-difference-
minimizing Pareto optimal distributions, (AC,BD) and (BC,AD); the latter is the unique Rawlsian solution 
and was chosen much more frequently. 
 
 19
 A comparison of the first rows in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, suggests that the 
failure of Pareto optimality is less prominent in the ordinal than in the cardinal treatment. 
This is particularly transparent in the comparison of R3 in EXP I (treatment CARD) with 
R2 EXP III (treatment ORD). In both cases, there is an unambiguous “equal split” 
reference distribution, (BD,AC) in R3 of EXP I and (AB,CD) in R2 of EXP III, and 
exactly one distribution that Pareto dominates this reference distribution; in both cases it 
is the distribution (AD,BC). In R3 of EXP I, the reference distribution was chosen in 61% 
(= 14/23) of all cases, whereas in R2 of EXP III only in 8% (= 2/24) of all cases. We 
conducted a Fisher test and found the differences in behavior in the two treatments to be 
highly significant.
26
 
 To summarize, our results confirm the relevance of the CPIES rule as an outcome-
oriented criterion in both the cardinal and the ordinal treatment. Our analysis also shows 
that efficiency in the sense of Pareto optimality plays a more prominent role in the 
ordinal setting. 
 
Treatment CARD 
 
Treatment ORD 
 
Allocation 
Choice 
Payoff 
Difference 
Payoff 
Sum 
 
 
Allocation 
Choice 
Rank 
Difference 
Rank 
Sum 
Payoff 
Difference 
–0.5354 1.0000  
 Rank 
Difference 
–0.2388 1.0000  
Payoff 
Sum 
0.2704 0.1475 1.0000 
 
Rank Sum –0.4430 –0.1966 1.0000 
Pareto 
Optimality 
0.1598 0.3145 0.6180 
 Pareto 
Optimality 
0.4021 0.1154 –0.8187 
 
Table 9: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
The tables are based on the 6 allocations that give 2-good bundles to both individuals.27 Calculations are 
based on 1098 observations in the cardinal and 1104 observations in the ordinal treatment. All correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
                                               
26
 Specifically, we asked whether subjects chose the Pareto dominated equal split distribution more often in 
the cardinal treatment than in the ordinal treatment. We tested the equal split distribution both against all 
Pareto optimal choices (case i), and against only the Pareto improvements from equal split (case ii). 
Moreover, we tested R2 of EXP III both against the data of R3 in EXP I (p ≤ 0.001 in case i, p ≤ 0.001 in 
case ii) and against the aggregated data from the two identical problems in R3 of EXP I and R3 of EXP II 
(p ≤ 0.001 in case i, p ≤ 0.005 in case ii). In each case, the difference in behavior in the ordinal and cardinal 
treatments is thus highly significant. 
27 Results based on all allocations are qualitatively the same although somewhat noisier; they include the 
most extreme allocations where one person gets everything or almost everything, and the other person gets 
little or nothing – these allocations were hardly ever chosen. 
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 This finding is confirmed when considering pairwise correlation coefficients 
between the choice of an allocation (value: 0 or 1) and Pareto optimality (value: 0 or 1), 
see Table 9. In the ordinal treatment chosen allocations are more frequently Pareto 
optimal than in the cardinal treatment. The table also shows that for the chosen allocation 
the payoff and rank difference are smaller than for the allocations that were not chosen. 
Moreover, the payoff sum is larger and respectively the rank sum is smaller among the 
chosen allocations.
28
 As in Tables 7 and 8, payoff differences are more closely related to 
an allocation choice than rank differences. This suggests that when cardinal information 
is available, comparisons between individuals matter more, whereas when information is 
only of an ordinal nature, Pareto optimality is more relevant. 
Regressions yield similar results (see Appendix 3) and additionally provide direct 
evidence for the role of CPIES through the inclusion of interaction terms – Pareto 
optimality combined with payoff or rank difference respectively decreases the likelihood 
of an allocation being chosen. Therefore, whilst allocations are more likely to be chosen 
when Pareto optimal, this effect is mitigated if the payoff or rank difference is large, as 
predicted by CPIES. 
 
4.2 Procedural Aspects 
We now take a closer look at the procedural aspects of bargaining behavior, in particular 
in relation to the CPIES rule. Evidently, not all bargaining problems have equal 
discriminatory power with respect to the CPIES rule. For instance, in some problems 
there is no Pareto improvement relative to the reference allocation (EXP I, R4 & R5; 
EXP II, R1, R2, R4 & R5; EXP III, R3). In all these problems, a clear majority of 
bargaining partners settled on the reference allocation. While this is clearly in line with 
the CPIES prediction, it can be counted as evidential support only for the “reference-
                                                                                                                                            
In R1 and R4 of EXP III (treatment ORD), the allocation rankings are not monotone w.r.t. bundle size and 
they were therefore excluded.  
28 Observe that low ranks correspond to preferred bundles, so that a negative sign indicates that better 
ranked allocations were chosen more frequently. 
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dependent” part of the CPIES rule.
29
 To test for the specific “Pareto improvement” part, it 
is useful to concentrate on specific bargaining problems. Specifically, we will consider 
R3 of EXP I and EXP II, respectively, in the cardinal treatment, and R2 of EXP III and 
EXP IV, respectively, in the ordinal treatment. We turn to the cardinal treatment first. 
Figure 1 describes how the relative share of the allocations in the agreements 
evolved over time in EXP I, R3 and EXP II, R3. The bars in the figure describe the 
relative frequency of allocations in the agreements reached up to the corresponding 
minute. Thus, e.g., the second bar on the left side means that in EXP I, R3 two thirds of 
all agreements that were reached in the first three minutes were on the equal distribution 
(labeled EQ), 17% on the Pareto optimal allocation (AB,CD) which does not represent a 
Pareto improvement relative to the equal distribution (denoted by PO), and 20% on the 
allocation (AD,BC) which Pareto improves upon the equal distribution (denoted by PI), 
and so on. In EXP I, one can see a tendency of the Pareto improving allocation (AD,BC) 
to gradually gain support: the share of both the agreements on the equal distribution 
(BD,AC) as well as on the non-improving Pareto optimal allocation (AB,CD) decreases 
over time. A similar pattern can be discerned in EXP II as well, with the proviso that 
already in the first minute one pair agreed on the Pareto improving allocation. 
   
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative final allocations in treatment CARD 
The bars describe the relative frequency of allocations in the agreements reached up to the corresponding 
minute. The Pareto improving allocation predicted by CPIES is denoted by “PI” and the equal reference 
allocation is labeled “EQ”; the Pareto optimal allocation which does not improve upon the equal 
distribution is denoted by “PO”.  
                                               
29 Nevertheless, there is evidence also in the discussions of these bargaining problems that some players 
tried to follow the CPIES rule. They discuss which allocation has the smallest difference in rank and 
payoffs and mention that they are unsuccessfully looking for improvements. 
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The temporal pattern revealed by Figure 1 may serve as a first indication of a procedural 
aspect of the CPIES rule, since evidently the identification of the equal distribution and 
the possibilities to Pareto improve upon it needs effort and time. However, these numbers 
are based on final agreements only. To shed light on the principles that guided subjects’ 
bargaining behavior, we analyzed the communication protocols of bargaining partners. 
The following table quantifies how many pairs of subjects mentioned the equal 
distribution and the possibility of Pareto improvement, respectively, at some stage in the 
bargaining process. The tables distinguish between pairs that settled for the equal 
distribution (EQ) and those who chose the Pareto improvement of the equal distribution 
(PI). 
EXP I, R3 
 
 
 
 
EXP II, R3 
 
Equal 
Distribution 
Mentioned 
Final 
Allocation 
Total 
 
EQ PI  
Yes 8 8 16  
No 0 4 4  
Total 8 12 20  
Fisher exact test (one-tailed) 0.1022 
 
 
Table 10: Reference to CPIES in the communication protocols (treatment CARD) 
The table gives the number of pairs in EXP I, R3 and EXP II, R3 who mentioned the equal distribution 
and/or discussed the issue of Pareto improvement. Pairs are distinguished according to the final allocation 
on which they settled (EQ or PI). 
 
Equal 
Distribution 
Mentioned 
Final 
Allocation Total  
EQ PI  
Yes 14 5 19  
No 0 2 2  
Total 14 7 21  
Fisher exact test (one-tailed) 0.1000 
Pareto 
Improvement 
Discussed 
Final 
Allocation Total  
EQ PI  
Yes 2 4 6  
No 12 3 15  
Total 14 7 21  
Fisher exact test (one-tailed) 0.0642 
Pareto 
Improvement 
Discussed 
Final 
Allocation Total  
EQ PI  
Yes 2 7 9  
No 6 5 11  
Total 8 12 20  
Fisher exact test (one-tailed) 0.1569 
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Table 10 provides clear evidence that some bargaining partners indeed used the CPIES 
rule (or something close to it) as a guide for their reasoning.
30
 For instance, consider the 
pairs that settled on the equal distribution (14 pairs in EXP I and 8 pairs in EXP II). The 
entries in the two bottom matrices of Table 10 reveal that four of them, two in EXP I and 
two EXP II, were aware of the possibility of a Pareto improvement in the bargaining 
process but rejected it in favor of equality. The entries in the two top matrices are perhaps 
even more significant. Consider the pairs who settled on the Pareto improving allocation 
according to CPIES (7 in EXP I and 12 in EXP II). Of these, 5 pairs in EXP I and 8 pairs 
in EXP II mentioned the equal distribution during the bargaining process; moreover, 6 of 
these pairs explicitly mentioned the fact that they were both better off than with an equal 
split in the chat protocols. From this we conclude that the CPIES rule describes the 
behavior of at least a significant subgroup of our subjects quite accurately in these 
bargaining problems.  
 We turn to the ordinal treatment. Some of the scenarios involved several different 
possibilities to improve upon the reference allocation, i.e. the allocation that minimizes 
the rank difference. For instance all three allocations chosen in EXP IV, R5 constitute 
Pareto improvements relative to the reference allocation. In such examples, the focus is 
not so much on whether the CPIES rule applies or not, but on which improvement should 
be implemented. We therefore concentrate in the following on the ordinal problems EXP 
III, R2 and EXP IV, R2 which are structurally the most similar to EXP I, R3 and EXP II, 
R3. The following table summarizes the results. 
 
                                               
30 Table 10 does not consider the two pairs who settled on the non-improving Pareto optimal allocation 
(AB,CD) in EXP I. 
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EXP III, R2 
 
 
 
 
EXP IV, R2 
 
Equal 
Allocation 
Mentioned 
Final Allocation 
Total 
 
EQ PI other  
Yes 1 10 0 11  
No 0 11 2 13  
Total 1 21 2 24  
Chi-test     0.2716 
 
Pareto 
Improvement 
Discussed 
Final Allocation 
Total 
 
EQ PI other 
 
Yes 0 3 0 3  
No 1 18 2 21  
Total 1 21 2 24  
Chi-test     0.6514 
Table 11: Reference to CPIES in the communication protocols (treatment ORD) 
The table gives the number of pairs in EXP III, R2 and EXP IV, R2 who mentioned the equal distribution 
and/or discussed the issue of Pareto improvement. Pairs are distinguished according to the final allocation 
on which they settled (EQ, PI, or other). 
 
Table 11 suggests that the CPIES rule plays a significant role in the ordinal treatment as 
well. For instance, of the 17 pairs who settled on the Pareto improvement of the equal 
split (PI) in EXP III five pairs mentioned the equal distribution; similarly, of the 21 pairs 
who settled on PI in EXP IV 10 mentioned the equal distribution, again a clear indication 
that equal split serves as reference point even in cases in which it is not chosen.
31
 The 
main difference of the results in the ordinal treatment (EXP III, R2 and EXP IV, R2) on 
the one hand and of the cardinal treatment (EXP I, R3 and EXP II, R3) on the other hand 
is that in the former much fewer pairs settled for the equal distribution. We suspect, based 
on participant comments in the chat protocols, that the rank of a bundle in the preference 
ordering is used as a proxy for its unknown monetary value and therefore rank 
                                               
31 It is perhaps also remarkable that only one of those pairs who did not choose according to CPIES (five 
pairs in EXP III and two pairs in EXP IV) mentioned the equal distribution, an indication that these pairs 
either were not aware of the possibility to implement allocations with equal ranks, or that they did not 
consider this as an attractive solution.  
Equal 
Distribution 
Mentioned 
Final Allocation 
Total 
 
EQ PI other  
Yes 2 5 1 8  
No 0 12 4 16  
Total 2 17 5 24  
Chi-test     0.0424 
Pareto 
Improvement 
Discussed 
Final Allocation 
Total 
 
EQ PI other  
Yes 2 5 1 5  
No 0 12 4 19  
Total 2 17 5 24  
Chi-test     0.2570 
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differences are only an imperfect measure for (in)equality. The allocation minimizing the 
rank difference is no longer the only possible reference point, which in turn favors Pareto 
optimal outcomes despite possible rank differences. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our experimental results suggest a particular qualitative description of how agents reach 
agreements in bargaining problems with indivisibilities, the CPIES procedure. The key 
element is the role of “equal split” as the reference point for the bargaining procedure. 
Pareto improvements are implemented provided that they do not create too much 
inequality. Indeed, our most striking finding is that a majority of 51% of bargaining 
partners reject the payoff distribution (46,75) in favor of the Pareto inferior equal split 
distribution (45,45) (aggregated data from EXP I, R3 and EXP II, R3). This is in contrast 
to the results of C&R, who “find a strong degree of respect for social efficiency” (p.849). 
It also conflicts with Kritikos and Bolle’s (2001) experiments in which the majority of 
participants were efficiency- rather than equity-oriented. However, the experiments in 
these studies consisted of simple dictator games and not of dynamic bargaining games as 
in our present study. Indeed, inspecting the communication protocols we found strong 
evidence that procedural aspects play a decisive role in our experiments. For instance, in 
R3 of EXP I five of the seven pairs who settled on the Pareto optimal distribution (46,75) 
considered the equal payoff distribution (45,45) at an earlier stage, confirming the 
explicit reference status of the latter.  
In this example, it also seems to matter who is the first to propose the Pareto 
improvement. A detailed analysis of this issue of path-dependence is beyond the scope of 
the present paper, but generally partners seem to agree more easily on the payoff 
distribution (46,75) if the first individual suggests it to the second individual than vice 
versa. It seems to matter whether the individual suggesting the Pareto improvement 
benefits more or less than the other person – an issue, we plan to investigate further. 
 The failure of Pareto optimality due to equity concerns is much less pronounced 
in the ordinal treatment, even though we do find evidence that the ranks of bundles in the 
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preference orderings serve as substitutes for the unknown monetary payoff. In the ordinal 
treatment, in some cases there is no longer one clear equal split reference distribution 
because the inequality associated with any rank difference is unknown. Despite this 
difficulty, most participants try to establish an “equal split“ reference allocation during 
the bargaining process confirming the key role this reference allocation plays. 
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Appendix 1: Matching of Bargaining Partners 
 
The following table shows how individuals were matched in each round of each session. 
The numbers in the table refer to the 8 individuals. The columns indicate the rounds. 
Each row shows the bargaining partners in the respective round with the individual in the 
role of player 1 named first. 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
1 5 1 8 1 2 7 1 6 1 
2 6 2 5 3 4 8 2 7 2 
3 7 3 6 5 6 5 3 8 3 
4 8  4 7 7 8 6 4 5 4 
 
Table A1: Matching of Bargaining Partners 
 
 
Each experiment consists of 6 sessions with 8 participants each, i.e. there were 48 
participants in each experiment. Each experiment yielded 6 independent observations of 
up to 4 (and never fewer than 3) choices by the matched pairs. 
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Appendix 2: Binomial Test of the CPIES prediction 
 
The following table indicates p-values for a one-tailed test. The rows indicate the 
different treatments. The columns show how many allocations ("#") are compatible with 
the CPIES prediction and how frequently any of them were chosen ("Occ"). The 
probabilities ("Prob") have been calculated under the assumption that all allocations 
in which each player receives two goods occur with a probability of 1/6 (ignoring any 
other allocations that may have been chosen
32
). In R1 and R4 of EXP III the probability 
assigned to each allocation has to be adjusted to 1/7 because the allocations with two-
good bundles span ranks 4-12 (instead of 6-11) and for 7 allocations
33
 both bundles are 
within that range. The same calculation can be done based on all 16 allocations, assuming 
that they all are equally likely. Those probability values are obviously even lower than 
the ones shown in the table. 
 
 # Occ Prob 
CARD 
EXP I 
R3 2 21/23 -81.1249 10⋅  
R4 1 21/22 -168.4333 10⋅  
R5 1 21/22 -168.4333 10⋅  
EXP II 
R1 1 19/24 -112.9488 10⋅  
R2 1 22/23 -161.4689 10⋅  
R3 2 20/20 -102.8680 10⋅  
R4 1 23/24 -172.5536 10⋅  
R5 1 22/24 -151.4817 10⋅  
ORD 
EXP III 
R1 3 20/22 -63.5396 10⋅  
R2 2 19/23 -61.6667 10⋅  
R3 1 19/23 -127.2964 10⋅  
R4 3 21/23 -61.6561 10⋅  
EXP IV 
R1 4 23/23 -58.9105 10⋅  
R2 2 22/24 -94.0824 10⋅  
R3 2 22/22 -113.1866 10⋅  
R4 3 24/24 -85.9605 10⋅  
R5 3 24/24 -85.9605 10⋅  
 
 
Table A2: p-values for the CPIES prediction 
 
                                               
32 In R5 of EXP I a total of 23 choices were made and in R2 of EXP III a total of 24 choices – however, in 
each of these two cases, one allocation is outside the range of two-bundle allocations. Taking the additional 
allocation into account changes the probability for R5 in EXP I to 
-15
8.1559 10⋅  and for R2 in EXP III 
to
-6
5.4792 10⋅ . 
33
 The relevant allocations are (AB,CD), (AC,BD), (AD,BC), (BC,AD), (BD,AC), (CD,AB), and (ABC,D). 
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Appendix 3: Regression Results 
 
The regression table below models the probability of an allocation choice (1 if chosen) as 
a function of the properties of that allocation. In line with related work, such as C&R, the 
criteria considered are the payoff difference (PD), payoff sum (PS), and Pareto optimality 
(PO) in the cardinal allocation problems, and the rank difference (RD), rank sum (RS), 
and PO in the ordinal allocation problems. The analysis focuses on the six allocations 
where each individual receives 2 goods.
34
 The table reports results of OLS regressions 
and nested random effects models (GLLAMM
35
); the latter take into account that choices 
for each matched pair are related (same allocation problem), that choices within the same 
groups may be related due to the stranger matching scheme across different rounds 
(Appendix 1), and lastly, they consider the fact that choices within an experiment may be 
related because all groups faced the same sequence of the same problems.  
 
 
Allocation Choice 
Treatment CARD 
 
 
Allocation Choice 
Treatment ORD 
 OLS GLLAMM   OLS GLAMM 
PD 
–0.0137 
(0.0011) 
–0.0110 
(0.0012) 
 
RD 
–0.0609 
(0.0077) 
–0.0344 
(0.0101) 
PS 
0.0040 
(0.0003) 
0.0091 
(0.0010) 
 
RS 
0.0080 
(0.0012) 
–0.0466 
(0.0092) 
PO 
0.3851 
(0.332) 
0.3760 
(0.0327) 
 
PO 
0.6976 
(0.0700) 
0.5323 
(0.0619) 
PD * PO 
–0.0097 
(0.0014) 
–0.1280 
(0.0015) 
 
RD * PO 
–0.3580 
(0.0722) 
–0.1447 
(0.0159) 
N 1098 1098  N 1104 1104 
F(4,1094) 331.79   F(4,1100) 160.88  
R-squared 0.5482   R-squared 0.3688  
Log-
Likelihood 
 -123.3615 
 Log-
Likelihood 
 -236.5628 
 
Table A3: Allocation Choice as a Function of Allocation Parameters 
Standard errors are in brackets. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level. In the OLS regressions 
parameters are jointly significant at the 1% level.36  
                                               
34This eliminates two observed allocation choices in both the cardinal and ordinal treatment (EXP I R5, 
EXP II R1, EXP III R2, EXP III R5) and increases explanatory power. In the ordinal treatment two rounds 
(EXP III, R1 and R4) were dropped too, because the nature of the rankings in terms of the cardinality of the 
bundles is quite different there from the other allocation problems. 
35 See http://www.gllamm.org/. Here, a Gaussian function was used and the random effects were nested 
from matched pairs over groups to experiments. The number of conditions in the cardinal case is 264.1111 
(other specifications with similar log likelihoods have much higher numbers of conditions); the only non-
negligible random effect variance is the experiment with 0.4202. The number of conditions in the ordinal 
case is138.1275 (and is the only specification that converges); and again the only non-negligible random 
effect variance is the experiment with 0.9436. 
36 OLS regressions with robust errors or clustered on the groups yield F and t values that do not change 
joint or separate significance levels perceptibly. 
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The main explanatory variable here is Pareto optimality (dummy variable), which, as 
noted before, has a much stronger impact in the ordinal case. An interesting feature 
emerges from the interaction effect. The Pareto optimality effect for an allocation choice 
is mitigated strongly by the payoff or rank difference, i.e. although Pareto optimality 
strongly and significantly increases the likelihood of choosing an allocation, this is much 
less the case if there is a large payoff or rank difference – confirming the CPIES analysis. 
The results here should be interpreted with great care. As is well known, a linear 
probability model cannot prevent values outside the [0,1] range – we observe such values 
here, although very close to the interval boundary. A multinomial model would address 
this; however, it cannot be applied here, since allocations are not comparable across 
treatments except for the equal-split allocation.  
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Appendix 4: Instructions and Screen Examples 
 
(The following is a translation of the German instructions for EXP 1 – as close as possible to the 
German original.  The original instructions are available upon request from the authors.) 
 
In this experiment you will repeatedly have to distribute several goods between yourself and a 
partner.  The experiment has five independent rounds, each of which you will play with a 
different partner.  In each round you will be given four goods, and you will have to agree with 
your partner on a distribution of these goods. 
 
There will be four new goods in each round.  The goods are referred to as A, B, C and D, 
respectively.  You can think of any kind of object and any kind of division problem.  The goods 
themselves are indivisible, i.e. each good can either be given to you or to your partner.  All goods 
have a positive value.  The more goods you receive, the better.  However, the value of the goods 
is different for you and your partner.  In each round, we give you a ranking of the bundles of 
goods in which the values of the bundles are listed in descending order.  In each round, you will 
be given a new ranking.  The ranking gives the value of each bundle of goods in Taler (T), our 
experimental currency.  If you agree with your partner on a distribution of goods, you will receive 
the Taler amount corresponding to your bundle of goods.  At the end of the experiment, these 
Taler amounts will be converted in Deutsche Mark (DM) and paid out to you. 
 
For example, your ranking could look as follows: 
 
 
 
In this case, your most preferred bundle consists of goods A, B, C and D; it is worth T 100.  Thus, 
if you and your partner agreed that he gets nothing and you get all four goods, then you would 
receive T 100.  Your second best bundle is ABD, for which you would receive T 95 if you agreed 
with your partner that you get ABD and he gets C.  Observe that the value of bundles of goods 
cannot be derived from the values of the single goods.  For instance, good C alone is worth T 11 
and good D alone is worth T 12, but both goods combined (CD) are worth T 55 to you.  It is also 
possible that a good is worth little when added to another bundle, e.g. the bundle ABD is worth T 
95 to you and adding C increases the value of the bundle only to 100 (ABCD), although good C 
alone is worth 11. In this case, good C does not add much value to the bundle ABD.  The goods 
complement each other in different ways depending on the specific goods with which they are 
combined.  Therefore, for all evaluations in this experiment you have to look at all bundles of 
goods and not only at the values of single goods.  Your partner also gets a ranking of his 
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valuations.  On the screen, you will see your partner’s ranking next to your own.  This may look 
as follows: 
 
 
 
Please start each round by carefully looking at both rankings.  The rankings will be different in 
each round.  Each round of this experiment lasts 10 minutes at most.  This time is indicated at the 
top right side of the screen and will be counted down to 0:00 during the round.  Within this time 
span you have to reach an agreement with your partner on who gets which good.  If you do not 
agree within 10 minutes, neither of you will receive anything in this round. 
 
 
 
You reach an agreement with your partner by sending him a proposal or by waiting for his 
proposal.  Each of you can make a proposal at the same time.  Your partner’s proposal appears in 
the top middle section and your own proposal appears directly beneath.  In both proposal lines, 
the goods you get appear in green, those received by your partner in red.  To make a proposal, 
select the goods you want to receive by clicking on the corresponding buttons, and then send the 
proposal by clicking on the “send” button. 
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You can change your proposal at any time by clicking on the A, B, C, D buttons.  Every click 
changes the color of the button and therefore moves the good from you (green) to your partner 
(red) or vice versa.  Unless you send your proposal, your partner cannot see your current 
selection.  The most recent proposal you sent can be seen in your ranking on the left – your 
corresponding bundle is shown in a green box. 
 
 
 
Do not delay sending your proposal because your partner will otherwise not know what you 
propose.  You can change your mind at any time and send a new proposal. 
 
 
 X
 
 
In order to convince a partner to accept your proposal, you can exchange messages in a “chat” 
window at the bottom right by commenting on your or your partner’s proposal.  To write in the 
chat line (max. 80 characters), you have to click on it with the mouse.  Press the “enter” key to 
send a comment.  If you want to leave the chat line without writing anything or without sending a 
comment, you have to press the “Esc” button.  If you want to change your proposal after having 
sent a comment, you will need to leave the chat line first. 
 
 
 
Your own comments appear in the chat terminal window with a leading “>” sign; your partner’s 
comments are shown without any additional sign at the beginning. 
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If the colors of all buttons in your proposal coincide with the colors of the buttons in your 
partner’s proposal, then you have made identical proposals.  
 
 
 
You will then be asked whether you want to accept that proposal. 
 
 
 
 XII 
 
If you and your partner select “Accept” the proposal is accepted and the round is over.  If neither 
or only one of you accepts the proposal, then the round continues, i.e. you can make new 
proposals or repeat old proposals, and chat.  A round is over either if you have both accepted a 
proposal or if the time limit is reached.  If the round has ended before the time limit, you will 
have to wait until the round is over for all other players – this will be indicated by an acoustic 
signal.  Then, the next round starts for everybody. 
 
 
 
At the end of each round you receive the Taler amount corresponding to your bundle of goods.  If 
you did not reach an agreement with your partner you receive no bundle of goods and therefore 
no Taler amount.  The Taler amounts you received will be added over the rounds and converted 
into DM at the end of the experiment.  T 12 equal DM 1. 
 
You will play with a different player in each round of the experiment, hence you never play with 
someone you have already played with.  You and your partner do not know with whom you play; 
you will be matched anonymously.  What proposals you make, what comments you send, and 
what bundle of goods you receive in any given round has no impact on your or your partner’s 
ranking of bundles, or on the matching of partners in future rounds. 
 
Please do not mention your name and do not make any comments that could reveal your identity.  
If you violate this rule you will receive no payment! 
 
All relevant information will appear on the screen.  A status line at the bottom of the screen 
indicates the current state of the experiment.  Before starting the experiment, you receive a 
number that corresponds to your computer terminal and you will be paid at the end based on your 
number. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
Please switch off your cell phones for the duration of the experiment.   
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Good Luck. 
 
 
